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These two works are about British Armoured 
Fighting Vehicle (AFV) technology in the 
Second World War. They are not about armoured 
warfare in that conflict. Nevertheless, both 
books, which can be considered part of the 
evolving field of "Gray Historic Literature,"1 
make a significant contribution to the story of 
AFV design, development and production. 
The author, David Fletcher, is well qualified 
for the task. He is Librarian at the Bovington 
Tank Museum at the Royal Armoured Corps 
(RAC) Centre, Bovington, Dorset, England. This 
museum houses one of the world's best col-
lections of archival and secondary source mate-
rial available to researchers of AFVs and armour 
at war in the 20th century. Fletcher had access 
to all the technical archival sources in the Tank 
Museum's Library, as well as to the museum's 
extensive collection of tanks and armoured 
cars. For the development of Part 2, he was able 
to use a complete collection of armoured reg-
imental war diaries. Fletcher's explanation of 
British AFV design and development from 
1939 to 1945 reflects the rich archival and 
material sources that were available to him. 
There are, however, serious problems with 
Fletcher's work. Although the publications are 
well-illustrated and nicely produced in a 
research report format with two columns of text 
per glossy page, the writing style is uneven 
and the manuscripts apparently were not 
edited. There are no sub-headings under main 
index headings, thus a single AFV index item, 
the A-12 Matilda for example, has 30 page 
numbers. If readers want to know the general 
characteristics of the A-12 Matilda they must 
thumb through all those page references! The 
overwhelming detail — and repetition — in 
these volumes cries out for section headings, 
and paragraph headings where the paragraphs 
exceed 500 words. Any number of textual or 
editorial methods could and should have been 
used to help readers find their way. 
More importantly there are no footnotes or 
bibliography and no suggested reading list. 
This is a pity because Fletcher clearly is one of 
a small handful of military-vehicle historians 
who have forgotten more about AFVs than 
most people ever will know. It would have 
been useful to identify at die least the museum's 
references, if not the archival ones. 
In addition to these problems of format, 
style and organization, Fletcher's overall 
approach concentrated too exclusively on tank 
technology.2 This emphasis led him to adopt 
the "great tank scandal" interpretation favoured 
by A. J. Smithers, who declared that "with the 
war nearly five years old and with the last 
two of them...[spent] planning the battles in 
Normandy.. .the country was cluttered up with 
tanks, most of them obsolete or useless."3 In 
concentrating on the technology, Fletcher was 
forced to exclude the context of technical devel-
opment — factors such as military thought, 
doctrine, organization and actual armoured 
warfare experience. That context suggests that 
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there were reasons other than technical for 
Britain's failure to sustain its distinguished 
reputation in the Western Desert after Rommel's 
arrival. According to Field Marshal Carver, 
"The relative quality of the tanks on both sides 
was fully discussed [in his Tobruk (1964)], and 
the conclusion reached that it was not as 
significant a factor as was claimed at the time."4 
Fletcher's assumption in Part 1, The Great 
Tank Scandal, was that "British tanks of the 
Second World War have a frightful reputa-
tion" —hence the title. His aim was to "explain, 
to some extent, how this came to be," and why 
tank development "did not improve very 
quickly." But Fletcher qualified this indict-
ment with the admission that, in fact, the sub-
ject was "not all gloom." On the contrary, he 
claimed that "Britain built some outstanding 
AFVs, and pioneered the expansion of armour 
into many specialized roles with a degree of 
ingenuity that was unmatched elsewhere, but 
she also relied heavily on overseas aid." 
By the time Part 2 was published, however, 
Fletcher had come to the conclusion that the 
positive aspects of British AFV develop-
ment were not really worth exploring. As he 
explained in the introduction, "From every 
quarter...I heard from people whose experi-
ence, either in industry or the firing line, coin-
cided with what I had written about the poor 
standard of British tank development in the 
early war years." He described Part 1 as "a very 
sorry story of political, industrial and military 
ineptitudes that condemned British and Com-
monwealth soldiers 'to fight on ponies against 
an enemy mounted on fullsize horses'....The 
facts thus revealed fully justified the title." 
Having found this technologically focussed 
constituency that was not much interested 
in the "outstanding AFVs," Fletcher's goal in 
Part 2 was obvious: to "carry the story for-
ward" from Part 1. The difference, Fletcher 
declared, was that a complete set of armoured 
regimental war diaries were now available at 
his museum. These presented Fletcher with 
another pleasant surprise, because he was able 
"to get much closer to user opinion...[that] 
revealed all manner of things which the tech-
nical archives do not cover." 
Fletcher used armoured warfare — the actual 
battles — only "as a backcloth" to his story. 
He argued that "a better grasp of the situation 
where tank availability, reliability and devel-
opment are concerned will at least help to 
explain why certain battles turned out as they 
did." This largely technical explanation rein-
forced a historical school that could be called 
the "All Technical School." What is offered is 
a technical way of explaining complex events 
like those that occurred in armoured warfare 
between 1939 and 1945. But there was much, 
much more going on, derived from military 
thought and action, not just from the research, 
design and development of AFV technology. 
For reasons arising from the British use of 
armour in the First World War, and from the 
thinking of theorists during the inter-war years, 
by 1939 there were two schools of thought on 
armoured warfare in Britain: the "All Tank 
School," and the beginnings of an "All Arms 
School." The former saw tanks in independent 
mobile operations ranging deep into an enemy's 
rear, while the latter saw tanks employed for the 
direct support of infantry. Moreover, within the 
All Tank School there were differences between 
those who favoured a balanced force of arms 
with AFVs, and those who saw a force consisting 
almost entirely of tanks. 
Even though the AFV resources to fulfill 
either theory did not exist in 1939, when the 
schools and their advocates were in powerful 
positions they influenced doctrine, which in 
turn influenced organization and directly 
affected tactical employment and the battlefield 
effectiveness of AFVs.5 The result of this com-
petition was that the British Army entered the 
war with three classes of tanks — infantry, 
cruiser and light. Of these, Infantry tanks 
emphasized armoured protection and armour-
defeating firepower, cruisers relied on mobil-
ity and all-round firepower, and light tanks 
stressed reliability and a small battlefield 
signature. 
The first part of the Western Desert war was 
seen as a brilliant success for the All Tank 
School. These operations demonstrated the 
effectiveness of British ideas, technology and 
even armour design. The workhorse AFV of the 
day was the A-12 Matilda with a small two-
pounder (40-mm) main gun that fired only 
armour-defeating ammunition. Under the 
generalship of Wavell (Commander-in-Chief), 
Maitland-Wilson (GOC British Troops in Egypt) 
and O'Connor (GOC Western Desert Force, the 
early name for the Eighth Army) their Com-
monwealth troops advanced 800 km (500 miles) 
in under ten weeks, captured 130 000 prison-
ers, 380 tanks and 845 guns. Their one corps, 
xm Corps, of two divsions destroyed ten Italian 
divisions. They suffered 1 928 casualties. Fol-
lowing the setback in France earlier in 1940, 
something seemed to be working well between 
December 1940 and February 1941, albeit 
against a lesser foe. 
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Then Rommel, and the Afrika Corps with 
their anti-tank gun screens arrived in theatre 
and Britain's reputation, self-esteem, ideas, 
doctrine and faith in their technology was dealt 
a major blow. Increasingly the All Tank School 
emphasis on more tanks than infantry (or anti-
tank guns) proved ineffective. But this period 
of relative failure cannot be explained by 
AFV design and development alone. Analysts 
also have to look at the use of anti-tank guns 
and field artillery and the lack of integration 
of these equipments into the armour-infantry 
groupings in either infantry divisions or 
armoured divisions.6 
During this troubled period of setbacks the 
All Arms school was vindicated but its success 
was also limited. The principles upon which 
it was based were far from easy to implement. 
Although the British had a long history of tank-
infantry cooperation, reorganizing across reg-
imental and corps lines demanded fundamental 
and sweeping changes within the combat arms 
of the British Army. This did not occur, and 
therefore neither of the schools provided the 
necessary doctrine and organization for success 
against the anti-tank screens. Not surprisingly 
this confused period did not produce either a 
well thought out, thorough concept of all-arms 
operations for armoured warfare, or clear and 
coherent design requirements for the equipment 
that was needed to make that concept work. If 
a historian is looking for scandal during this 
period, then the seeds of it were sown in 
1941-42. 
These weaknesses were hidden by the explo-
sion in British AFV design and development — 
much of it flawed — following the success of 
early 1941, as well as by the introduction of 
American AFVs into British regiments. These 
American tanks — initially the Grant and the 
light M5 Lee, known affectionately as the 
Honey — and then the M4 Sherman, must be 
considered from two points of view. First they 
were indépendant developments, outside the 
loop of British AFV design and production. 
Second, these tanks were highly respected by 
the British (and Canadian) tank crewman.7 
Thus U.S. competition was added to the mul-
titude of requirements that British industry 
had to meet. This complicated the process, 
because, it can be argued, the design require-
ments were flawed due to a lack of an ongoing 
doctrinal process that kept abreast of lessons 
learned through battle experience. By 1942 
there were up to 16 different models of tank, 
including three American types, meeting the 
three British tank requirements. 
In August 1942 Montgomery arrived as 
Commander-in-Chief Eighth Army to find a 
dispirited and under-equipped army that had lost 
its way. Monty's opinionated methods were 
needed in the fall of 1942 and early 1943. He fear-
lessly created Eighth Army plans (and necessary 
staffs to support his ideas), which were based on 
great attention to detail in offensive operations 
and a partial retention of the All Tank School's 
armour-heavy armoured division organization. 
Monty was successful in spite of the limi-
tations and problems in armoured theory, which 
reinforced the increasing weaknesses in British 
AFV design and production. He avoided these 
issues. There is not much evidence that Monty 
understood how to break through the anti-tank 
gun screens. He failed with his cruiser-based 
armour at Second El Alamein, and he failed 
again in Normandy in Operation GOODWOOD 
18-19 July 1944, when he let "loose a Corps of 
three armoured divisions in the open country 
about the Caen-Falaise road."8 Three weeks 
later First Canadian Army's Operation TOTAL-
IZE failed when Monty's Canadian protégé, 
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, loosed 
two armoured divisions of Sherman tanks 
down the same road, only to bog down in front 
of anti-tank screens. 
Even though his reputation waned with his 
failures, Monty persisted in supporting only 
one tank — the universal or capital tank was 
what he called it — which contributed to the 
gradual development late in the war of the 
Centurion, the triumph of British tank tech-
nology. This story presents the student of the 
war with an unsolvable question: if the British-
Canadian-Polish 21 Army Group had been 
equipped with Comet or Centurion (with their 
17 pounders) would Monty's Normandy and 
Rhineland battles have been any different? 
Or would the flawed doctrine and organization 
have blunted any technological edge that these 
AFVs provided? 
The relationship between AFV design and 
development and armoured warfare can be 
explained by considering two pairs of functions 
or factors. The first pair consists of the tank 
technology imperative and the events on the 
wartime battlefields. The two are linked using 
after-action reports and lessons-learned corre-
spondence. The second pair are military 
thought and doctrine on one hand and orga-
nization and all-arms tactics on the other. The 
link between these is the persistant two-pronged 
problem for the British (and the Allies) after 
1941: how to defeat German anti-tank screens 
and defensive positions in depth, and how to 
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integrate anti-armour weapons (towed and 
tracked) into the all-arms organization. Unless 
these four themes, with their linkages, are ana-
lyzed concurrently, the analysis of events over 
time is at best very limited and at worst seri-
ously flawed.9 
Can British failures at armoured warfare be 
attributed solely to "the great tank scandal" — 
the two year gap in design, development and pro-
duction progress — or should flawed doctrine, 
organization and tactics also be considered fun-
damental? Clearly the story of the British expe-
rience in armoured warfare in the Second World 
War cannot be told without examining the rela-
tionship between analysis, doctrine, organiza-
tion, tactics, training and technology. These 
issues were inextricably intertwined in the early 
1940s, as they are now. Fletcher seemed to 
understand this, but he didn't seem anxious to 
explore this crucial relationship. What he offers 
in its place is a limited version of events, dom-
inated by tank technology.10 
One of the legacies of Lady Thatcher's 
bottom-line Britain is that museums and other 
1. Beverly E. Bastian and Randolph Bergstrom, "Reviewing 
Gray Literature: Drawing Public History's Most Applied 
Works Out of the Shadows," The Public Historian 15, no. 2 
(Spring 1993): 63-77. Gray historic literature was described 
as having these qualities: 1. They have a specific purpose; 
they are practical works not intended as comprehensive 
or timeless histories of their subjects. 2. They have a par-
ticular client rather than a broad perspective of reader-
ship. 3. They have common physical characteritics, 
i.e. they are not published as books, 65-67. 
2. Tank technology is understood in the British com-
monwealth to be the research, design and development 
and production of AFVs. The standard works are 
R. M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fight-
ing Vehicles (London: McDonald, 1968), and Rolf Hilmes, 
Main Battle Tanks—Developments in Design Since 1945 
(London: Brasseys, 1987). Chapter 4 of Hilmes' work, 
"Assessment of the Various Development Philosophies," 
lays the groundwork for Second World War develop-
ment. Also Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis, British 
and American Tanks of World War II[Aico, 1975). 
3. A.J. Smithers, Rude Mechanicals—An Account of Tank 
Maturity During the Second World War (London: 
Leo Cooper, 1987), 204. Fletcher cited a much earlier 
reference that used the term "Great Tank Scandal" 
immediately following the war. Smithers produced a 
companion work to the former book: A New Excal-
ibur — The Development of the Tank 1909-1939 
(London: Grafton Books, 1988). 
4. Michael Carver, Dilemmas of the Desert War—A New 
Look at the Libyan Campaign 1940-1942 (London: 
Batsford, 1986) 141. Tobruk, (London: Batsford, 1964). 
5. The best explanation of these events and developments 
can be found in several outstanding essays, including 
institutions have been forced to make heritage 
pay. Museums seek wide appeal, understand-
ably linked to the need for private funding. 
The Bovington Tank Museum has been a suc-
cess in this regard. Not surprising then, the 
"Gray Historic Literature" that is produced at 
the museum is intended to appeal to the vast 
group of buffs, modellers and technical col-
lectors who patronize the museum and who are 
in the tank technology constituency. Their 
view of the war is a practical one — clear cause 
and effect, and a right way and a wrong way — 
and these publications support that notion. 
But such material history without context 
would not find much sympathy with histori-
ans who believe that people and ideas shape 
events at least as much as technology. 
I would recommend these two works — they 
are the best of their kind — with the caveat that 
they are written for "military-vehicle histori-
ans." They complement, but do not replace, 
some of the true jewels in the crown of AFV 
technology and armoured warfare history that 
are cited throughout this review.11 
one by David Fletcher, in J. P. Harris and F. N. Toase (eds.) 
Armoured Warfare, (London: St. Martin's Press, 1990). 
An earlier effort is Kenneth Macksey's Tank Warfare 
(Rupert Hart-Davis), 1975. 
6. The anti-tank factor deserves explanation. By March 
1943 the excellent towed 17 pounder (about equal to the 
dreaded German 88-mm) was in service and by 1944 a 
U.S. self-propelled gun was also in use. These formidable 
weapons were owned by the Royal Artillery regiments 
of the commonwealth armies and were treated almost 
like a fourth combat arm. They were never integrated 
fully into the forward brigades of armoured divisions. 
The outstanding state of British gun design and devel-
opment is demonstrated clearly by the rapid introduc-
tion of the towed 17 pounder into service (just over a 
year). Throughout 1943 AFV technicians sought to 
match the gun to an AFV, and the result was the best 
allied AFV in Europe — the Sherman Firefly. In the 
reviewer's opinion these two developments could not 
be accomplished concurrently. They were conducted 
quite quickly and this does not lend support to the 
"scandal" argument. 
7. The only tank in British (and Canadian) service in Sicily 
(May-July 1943) and thereafter in Italy was the U.S. M4 
Sherman. 
8. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 689. Weinberg took 
this quote from a letter Monty wrote to Brooke on 
14 July 1944. 
9. While the author erred in not casting his net wide 
enough to include all aspects of the "anti-armour fac-
tor," he was right in including the development of 
armoured cars in these works as part of the quest towards 
a main battle tank. Armoured car units — a 1944 corps 
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10. 
reconnaissance regiment could throw out 60 Staghounds 
across a two division front — had increased in power 
and reliability and they were a natural utility and secu-
rity force to complement any armoured division. Had 
anti-tank guns been grouped with these units then 
they might have provided screens that secured (if not 
exploited) tactical successes and covered preparations 
for follow-up phases. 
This version of events is a compelling one in many 
quarters. Blaming technology for battlefield ineffec-
tiveness eliminates die need for analysis of the human 
side of events — generalship, leadership, training, 
morale and so on. 
11. Canadians in particular should note that the first-ever 
work on the Canadian armoured experience is forth-
coming in the summer of 1995. John F. Wallace, Dragons 
of Steel — Canadian Armour in Two World Wars 
(Canada: General Store Publishing, 1995). 
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Paul Fussell, who served as an infantry officer 
in France where he was seriously wounded, 
sees the Second World War as a meaningless 
struggle in which the mindless devotees of 
"chicken-shi t" (or its approximate Brit ish 
equivalent, "bullshit") sent hundreds of thou-
sands of hapless young men to their deaths. 
They did not simply get killed, they were blown 
apart, the battlefield strewn with guts, brains 
and severed limbs. Soldiers were forced into a 
dreary uniformity and lost their identities. Their 
only forms of release were demotic language, 
cigarettes, drink and frantic masturbation. Life 
in wartime was mostly numbingly boring but 
was punctuated by periods of sheer terror in 
which even seasoned veterans soiled their 
pants. The military was incompetent, chaotic 
and wasteful; the normal state of affairs summed 
up in the acronym SNAFU. 
War is indeed ugly and brutal, but the con-
stant repetition of this unpleasant truth soon 
becomes tiresome, and for all the lies, cruelty, 
suffering, hypocrisy, stupidity and vindictive-
ness, the Allied cause was a just one. The world 
had to be rid of Nazism, fascism and Japanese 
imperialism, and the struggle against these 
evils was far from pointless. In spite of the 
author's noble sentiments about the horrors of 
war, his sparkling prose style and his wide-
ranging interests, it is not really clear what the 
book is intended to achieve. Much of what 
Fussell has to say about the social history of 
the war has been better said by historians such 
as John Mor ton Blum, Angus Calder and 
Paul Addison. As a study of the literature of 
the war years, it falls well below the standard 
set by his earlier study of The Great War and 
Modern Memory. The examination of popular 
culture is superficial, remarks on Germany in 
wartime are very wide of the mark, and there 
is a great deal that is downright false. 
M u c h is m a d e of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n by 
Cyril Connolly's Horizon to the war effort, in 
that it upheld civilized values. Its standards 
were "breathtaking" and it achieved an "unbe-
lievable excellence." The awful and indolent 
Cyril Connolly's "brave uncompromising atti-
tude" sustained him through the "horrors and 
darkness" of the war. In fact Horizon only had 
a maximum of 5 000 subscribers and much of 
it was pretentious, snobbish, self-pitying drivel. 
Connolly's bon mot, "perfect fear casteth out 
love," said here to be an injunction to a "new 
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